Why SBOMs, signing, and provenance still don’t tell you if software is safe
Overview
The article discusses the advancements made in software supply chain security, particularly through the implementation of Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs), code signing, and provenance tracking, largely driven by Executive Order 14028. While these measures have improved visibility and authenticity of software components, the author argues that they do not fully address the crucial question of what the software can actually do when executed. This gap leaves organizations exposed to risks that these security measures alone cannot mitigate. The piece emphasizes that understanding the potential actions of the code at runtime is essential for truly assessing software safety, suggesting that current practices still fall short of ensuring comprehensive security.
Key Takeaways
- Timeline: Newly disclosed
Original Article Summary
We have made real progress in software supply chain security, improving visibility into software components, authenticity and build integrity. Much of this progress traces back to Executive Order 14028, which pushed agencies, contractors and enterprises to invest in SBOMs, signing and provenance. All of that matters, but it is not enough. The current software trust model still stops short of the question that determines risk at execution: What is this code capable of doing if … More → The post Why SBOMs, signing, and provenance still don’t tell you if software is safe appeared first on Help Net Security.
Impact
Not specified
Exploitation Status
No active exploitation has been reported at this time. However, organizations should still apply patches promptly as proof-of-concept code may exist.
Timeline
Newly disclosed
Remediation
Not specified
Additional Information
This threat intelligence is aggregated from trusted cybersecurity sources. For the most up-to-date information, technical details, and official vendor guidance, please refer to the original article linked below.